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1. Introduction 
 
In a survey among university undergraduates in Beijing, we have asked earnings 
expectations for two scenarios: go to work after completing their Bachelor degree or 
finish a Master degree and then go to work. Applying the method developed by Dominitz 
and Manski (1996), asking for the probabilities that income will be 25% above or below 
the expected value, we have an indication of the extent of uncertainty or risk implicit in 
their anticipated earnings. We relate the intention to continue education for a Master 
degree to expected earnings and to anticipated uncertainty and find that the former has 
significant effect and the latter has not.  
 
Our results contribute to a very small literature
1. After the seminal contribution by 
Levhari and Weiss (1974), there was related work by Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Kodde 
(1985). Williams (1979) moves away from single up front decision making by applying 
stochastic dynamic programming. Belzil and Hansen (2002) estimate such a model on 
American data. Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) extend the basic human capital model with 
unemployment risk and a wage offer distribution rather than a single given wage. The 
special issue on Education and Risk published by Labour Economics in 2007 testifies of a 
growing interest in the topic. Still, many questions are waiting for an answer.  
 
The contribution of this paper is the combination of privately held perceptions on the 
wage consequences of different schooling scenarios with intended choice for one of these 
scenarios. This, in our view, has decisive methodological virtue. With our data, there is 
no need to worry about selectivity in observed wage data, as individuals reveal their 
private information in the anticipated wage distributions that they provide. A potential 
drawback is that we use intentions rather than actual outcomes. The effect may be minor 
in our case, where the time interval between measured intention and actual choice is 
small. Still, an obvious extension of our work will be to collect to collect data on 
perceived effects of schooling alternatives and actual choices.  
 
                                                 
1 A more extensive review of literature is given in Hartog and Bajdechi (2007).   3
 
2. The survey 
 
In June 2007, we held a survey among bachelor students of six universities in Beijing. 
We gave out the questionnaires to the Students Affairs Department of the six universities, 
and let the staff of the department take care of the distribution. We asked them to give out 
the questionnaires to junior and senior students. At the same time, they should consider 
major/gender/family background when the respondents were selected. We have no reason 
to suspect systematic deviation from randomness and certainly not selectivity in relation 
to anticipated questionnaire answers. 4600 questionnaires were sent out and 4272 valid 
questionnaires were retrieved, a response rate of 93%. In the survey we asked for 
personal (demographic) information, family background, plans and ambitions and risk 
attitudes. We also asked the following question: 
We now ask you about your expectation of future earnings. Suppose you find a job after 
graduation as a bachelor student： 
(1) the earnings you expect for your first job:   Yuan/month  
(2) the probability of earning less than  75% of stated expected wages, rounded at 
nearest 10 Yuan 
(3) the probability of earning more than 125% of stated expected wages, rounded at 
nearest 10 Yuan 
 
We asked the same earnings questions with ten years of work experience. We also asked 
all these questions after completing a Master: Now suppose you continue education after 
you graduate as a master student. If you go to work, etc. 
 
We also ask for plans after graduation as a bachelor. Among our 4272 respondents, 2913 
or 68 percent intend to continue their studies while the remaining 1359 or 32 percent plan 
to start working. The dependent variable in our analysis will be the plan after obtaining 
the bachelor degree: continue education or work.  
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In Table 1 we characterise our sample: the variables we use as controls and their means 
and standard deviations. Bachelor students who plan to work after graduation, rather than 
continue for a Master degree, come from families with slightly higher average income, 
lower levels of parental education and occupation and come less often from a large city. 
Students in engineering, science and management dominate in our data. All students 
overrate their academic performance, illustrating a well known phenomenon; but those 
who plan for work rate themselves lower in academic performance that those who plan 
for continued education.  
 
3. The quality of the earnings anticipations  
 
Earlier work has shown that the Dominitz-Manski method generates data of good quality 
(Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Manski, 2004; Schweri, Hartog and Wolter, 2011; Wolter, 
2000; Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2010).  If respondents are not constrained to obey the 
rules of probability, they may give inconsistent answers, but in the applications so far this 
appeared to be an insignificant problem, as could be checked by using recording of 
violations. In Table 2 we collect information on three types of inconsistencies: P(75), 
P(125) or P(75)+P(125) greater than 100, where P(75) stands for the probability of 
earnings below 75 percent of the expected value and P(125) for the probability of 
earnings above 125 percent of the expected value. We do this separately for Bachelor (B) 
and Master (M), at 0 and 10 years of experience. The scores are cumulative within each 
column. 784 individuals or 18 percent of the 4272 respondents violate the range 
restriction of probability at least once
2. Hence, 82 percent did not violate a range 
restriction in a survey where we did not explain anything about the nature of probability.  
In Schweri, Hartog and Wolter (2011), 65 percent of the sample of Swiss students never 
violated the range restriction; however, neither omitting the small group of respondents 
who committed more than one violation or leaving inconsistent data in and identify such 
                                                 
2 By imposing non-negativity on wages and applying minimum values for inequality restrictions (eg set 
wage equal to zero for the case of wages below 75 percent of the expectation), we can add further 
consistency tests by restricting the admitted range for expected wages. This generates no additional 
violations.    5
data points with a dummy variable had any effect on the results of that paper. We will 
apply similar sensitivity checks to our estimates.  
 
4.  The expectations  
 
Each individual provides us with four earnings expectations (conditional on Bachelor or 
Master diploma, with 0 and 10 years of experience, indicated as M0B, M10B, M0M and 
M10M, respectively) and eight probabilities (25% below or above expected earnings,  
conditional on Bachelor or Master diploma, with 0 and 10 years of experience). We 
define earnings risk R as the probability of obtaining earnings below 75% or above 125% 
of the expected value, by simply adding up the two tail probabilities
3. We will indicate 
the four risk measures, similar to expected earnings, as R0B, R10B, R0M and R10M. We 
will also define simple lifetime measures, by adding up values specified for zero 
experience and three times the values for 10 years experience, thus assuming a very 
simple lifetime profile. Discounting without any information on individual variation in 
discount rates makes no sense, as it would involve the same scaling factor for each 
individual. Lifetime values, for expected earnings and for probabilities (risk) will be 
indicated with L replacing 0 or 10.   
 
Table 3 presents sample characteristics for the base sample and for what we call the 
regression sample. The base sample, containing all valid observations, has different 
number of observations for different variables because of item non-response. In the 
regression sample we have eliminated outliers. Among the 4272 valid observations, we 
first restrict the sample to questionnaires with all anticipated average earnings data 
complete (N=3616), then drop the top 1% and the bottom 1% of lifetime incomes (N= 
3543) and finally restrict to questionnaires with all anticipated probabilities complete. 
The resulting sample of 3463 observations will be used for the regression analyses below 
(the “regression sample”). We also have a sample obtained after eliminating answers 
                                                 
3 We might have multiplied the joint tail probability by expected earnings, to proxy a standard deviation 
measured in the money metric. Using only the tail probabilities has the advantage of keeping the measure 
of  risk independent of expected earnings.    6
inconsistent with probability theory, the “no-inconsistency” sample, with 2947 
observations.  
 
The means of expected earnings, are presented in Table 3. A surprisingly high mean for 
inexperienced Bachelors is redressed if the sample is trimmed to eliminate outliers. On 
average all individuals expect substantial earnings growth with experience. The increase 
in average expected earnings between Master and Bachelor is smaller for those who 
intend to continue for a Master than for those who do not intend so (marginally so with 
no experience, but substantially so at 10 years of experience). This seems at variance with 
positive self-selection, although we should note that we consider growth in the means, 
not mean growth rates. Lifetime expectations are reported as the ratio between Master 
and Bachelor lifetime income (MLMB) and between Master and Bachelor lifetime risk 
(RLMB). The mean lifetime advantage is slightly larger for those who intend to go for a 
Master degree than for those who intend to stop with a Bachelor. Risk on average is 
smaller for those who intend to continue than for those who intend to stop, but the 
differences are truly marginal and disappear in the lifetime aggregation.  
 
The standard deviations of the distributions of lifetime ratios do not differ, but as Figure 1 
shows, they hide differences in shape: those who intend to stop have a more spiky 
distribution. Item non-response is higher among those who intend to go to work than 
among those who intend to continue school: We know the ratio of lifetime incomes for 
59% of the former and for 70% of the latter.  
 
     
5. Is uncertainty relevant? Baseline regressions 
 
Table 4 presents results of a logit regression on the intention to continue education at 
Master level. We have estimated six specifications:  
 
1)  all four income levels M0B, M10B, M0M, M10M and all four probability levels 
R0B, R10B, R0M, R10M,    7
2)  all four income levels in logs and all four probability levels 
3)  the ratio’s of income and probabilities for Master and Bachelor (eg M0M/M0B) 
4)  lifetime income with Bachelor and with Master and lifetime risk with Bachelor 
and Master (value at zero experience plus 3 times value at 10 years experience) 
5)  the log of lifetime income with Bachelor and log of lifetime income with Master 
and lifetime risk with Bachelor and Master 
6)  the ratio of lifetime income and lifetime risk 
 
We only get statistically significant results with specifications 2 and 5. The stronger 
performance of these logarithmic specifications neatly supports the human capital model.  
Results for the two specifications are reported in Table 4. The first two columns of the 
table give results when we use all observations, even if reported probabilities are 
inconsistent. We find that the logarithm of anticipated income with a Bachelor diploma 
has a negative effect on the inclination to continue education while anticipated income 
with a Master diploma has a positive effect, precisely as standard theory predicts. The 
four incomes have different weights in the decision. In specification (2), the income as 
experienced Bachelor has higher weight than the starting income, while the reverse holds 
for Master incomes. At zero experience, the Master income carries greater weight than 
the Bachelor income, but at 10 years experience, the Bachelor income dominates. In 
specification (5), with lifetime incomes, lifetime Master income dominates, although the 
weights are not far apart: if lifetime incomes as Bachelor and as Master increase at the 
same rate, the inclination to continue education increases.  
 
Risk is never significant. Adding a dummy to identify cases with inconsistent 
probabilities has no effect on estimated coefficients and is statistically insignificant. The 
results are qualitatively not different when we exclude observations with inconsistent 
probabilities. In fact, by excluding the inconsistent records we gain precision in the key 
results.  
 
Most controls have no significant effect: gender, degree of urbanisation of residence, 
field of study, family income and parental job type and education do not influence the   8
intention for further studies. Age of the respondent has a negative effect. Academic 
performance (grade quartile) has a strong positive effect. These results are quite 
remarkable: intention to continue is only significantly affected by academic ability, 
family background is entirely irrelevant. The effects of self-assessed ability (grade)   
quartile are substantial: with the lowest quartile as reference, in specification (4) of Table 
4, the marginal effects (and standard errors) are 0.074 (0.028), 0.162 (0.026) and 0.257 
(0.022).  
 
6. Adding risk attitudes.   
 
We have asked for risk attitudes with the following question: A person can behave 
differently in different fields. How would you assess your willingness to take risk in the 
following fields? The fields are Finance, Leisure/sports, Health, Education and Career. A 
respondent can answer in 11 categories, from 0, not at all prepared to take risk, to 10, 
very much prepared to take risk. This question has been used successfully elsewhere 
(Bonin et al). Empirical validation shows it correlates positively with risk attitudes 
derived from gambles with real money, but far from perfectly so (Dohmen et al; Hartog, 
Ding and Sun, 2010). We use the response in the field of education. The median value is 
between 5 and 6 (see Appendix A). If we were to consider a score of 5 as risk neutral, 
44% of respondents would be risk neutral, 28% risk averse and also 28% would be risk 
loving. The distribution would not be symmetric though, but have negative skew.  
 
Risk attitudes are supposed to have an impact through the response to perceived risk: risk 
averse individuals should respond more negatively to risk than risk lovers. We 
acknowledge this by specifying an interaction term for risk and risk attitude:  
() ( ) ii ii aRLB bD RLB cRLM d D RLM +∑ + +∑  where dummy  i D   = 1 if risk attitude RA is 
in interval i, and zero otherwise. Neither risk itself nor interaction with risk attitude has 
any significant effect. If we plot the coefficients, as in figure 2, the pattern does hint at 
systematic effects. The magnitude of the interaction effects decreases with declining risk 
aversion, and the signs of the coefficients tend to be opposite. Declining magnitudes are 
in conformity with theory: declining risk aversion should indeed lower the impact of risk.   9
However, the signs are contrary to expectation: risk in Bachelor earnings should have a 
positive effect on inclination to continue education, risk in Master earnings a negative 
effect. Thus, we should conclude that in our data risk does not have the impact on 
educational choice as theory predicts.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Our conclusion on the key question is quite clear. Anticipated risk, measured as 
dispersion in the individually anticipated wage distributions for different schooling 
scenarios, has no effect on the intended schooling choices. Mean earnings, however, do 
have the effect that theory predicts. We cannot claim causality here, as we cannot rule out 
that schooling intentions have an impact on stated earnings expectations. Repeating the 
experiment in different settings is needed to check if our results have general validity.  
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Table 1. Sample characteristics (percentage distributions and income levels) 
 
  continue education  going to work 
Major 
Philosophy      0.77  0.30 
Economics 7.86  8.81 
Law 4.12  5.87 
Educational studies  0.28  0.23 
Chinese language  
and literature  5.94  7.76 
History 0.07  0.08 
Science studies  18.19  8.89 
Engineering 47.73  53.61 
Agriculture 0.07  0.00 
Medical studies  4.78  0.90 
Management Science  10.13  13.55 
Strategics 0.07  0.00 
Academic performance 
Lowest 25%           6.96  14.38 
Lower 25%  23.55  34.46 
Upper 25%  36.77  35.38 
Top 25%  32.72  15.77 
Home location 
Village 15.35  22.08 
Town or township level  7.54  10.39 
County town  31.33  29.63 
City  45.78  37.91 
Female    0.38  0.36 
Parents’ occupation  father  mother  father  mother 
Administrator   15.44  5.12  10.57  3.23 
Manager 5.44  2.71  4.81  3.46 
Clerical/office staff   20.52  20.46  14.20  13.53   13
Professional 8.89  9.56  7.02  5.11 
Self-employed 7.16  5.88  9.07  6.77 
Salesclerk or Service 
worker    1.76  4.15  2.52  4.41 
Owner of private firm     4.14  2.38  5.21  3.46 
Worker      10.08  7.87  10.02  7.47 
Farmer/herdsman/fisherfolk 14.04  16.20  22.24  23.76 
Retired staff     3.96  9.64  4.73  11.33 
Unemployed,partly 
unemployed    3.42  10.43  4.34  11.49 
Other 5.15  5.59  5.28  5.98 
Parents’ education      
 Never schooled                    1.25  3.46  2.47  5.42 
Elementary school  4.95  9.90  8.42  13.94 
Junior middle school  16.50  17.31  22.02  23.39 
Senior middle school  27.01  29.14  32.30  29.12 
Professional middle school/ 
Technical secondary school  4.53  7.77  4.56  5.27 
Junior college  18.85  16.17  13.60  12.01 
College/university 21.92  14.07  14.22  9.14 
Graduate 4.99  2.17  2.40  1.70 
  Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D 
Family  Income (per year)  38250 43438 33964  46906 
Age  21.31 0.98  21.60  1.08 
N 2,913  1,359 
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Table 2. Inconsistency of earnings expectations  
  (1)  (2)  (3)        (4) 
 P(75)  > 
100 
P(125) > 100  P(75)  + 
P(125) 
> 100 
At least one 
of these 3 
conditions 
M0B 385  392  709  709 
M10B 434  436  754  754 
M0M 470  474  740  740 
M10M 512  517  784  784 
   15
 
Table 3 Expected incomes and anticipated risk  
  all observations          regression   sample   (N=3466)   
  Stop     Continue     stop (N =  1030 )  continue (N= 2436 ) 
  N  mean  st dev  N  mean   st dev mean st  dev  mean st  dev 
M0B  1304 12173   279549   2683  4071   27488   2936   2601   3264   3391  
M10B  1264 38003   570065   2599  35682   487790   17458   65504   21722  216125  
M0M  1133 4808   6952   2741  6406   42940   4774   6597   5249   5100  
M10M  1107 31907   180052   2674  36500   303202   29529   180714  31597   241503  
MLMB  1052 1.52   1.09   2491  1.57   0.99   1.52   1.09   1.56   0.97  
R0B  1278 72.80   42.58   2605  71.06   45.22   73.06   38.11   70.78   36.20  
R10B  1257 75.51   34.97   2579  74.73   35.27   76.40   33.83   75.03   34.20  
R0M  1116 72.41   35.69   2683  70.76   35.08   72.48   35.07   70.71   34.05  
R10M  1104 74.01   35.29   2654  73.36   34.87   74.18   34.42   73.07   33.84  
RLMB  1030  1.03  0.57 2436  1.03 0.53 1.03   0.57   1.03   0.53  
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Table 4 Logit estimates: intention to continue to Master education (coefficients x 100) 
 




specification  (2) (5) (2) (5) 
lgM0B  -0.123  -7.225  












  (6.967)  (8.074)  
R0B -0.171  -0.265  
  (0.161)  (0.252)  
R10B 0.080    -0.154   
  (0.201)  (0.274)  
R0M  -0.019  0.083  
  (0.209)  (0.286)  
R10M  0.124  0.258  
  (0.216)  (0.290)  
lgMLB   -30.088
**  -43.353
*** 
   (9.994)   (11.433) 
lgMLM   38.141
***  52.086
*** 
   (9.243)   (10.596) 
RLB   -0.027  -0.104 
   (0.055)  (0.075) 
RLM   0.018  0.069 
   (0.054)  (0.073) 
cons 1.768  4.158
** 1.449 4.197
* 
  (1.485) (1.402) (1.811) (1.709) 
N  3463 3463 2947 2947 
pseudo R
2  0.107 0.101 0.115 0.109 
Log 
likelihood 
-1881.923 -1894.657 -1571.900 -1583.792 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
All regressions include controls for age, gender, residence, field of study, grades and parental background   17
 
Figure 1. Distribution of ratios of lifetime returns, Master over Bachelor degree; 
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Figure 2. Risk attitude interaction dummies  
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 Appendix A. Frequency distribution for risk attitude 
 
How do you see yourself: Are you in general a person who takes risk or do you try to eva




Freq. Percent  Cum. 
    
0   125  2.94  2.94 
1 83  1.95  4.89 
2 197  4.63  9.53 
3 381  8.96  18.49 
4 384  9.03  27.52 
5 709  16.68  44.20 
6 626  14.73  58.93 
7 743  17.48  76.41 
8 536  12.61  89.01 
9 148  3.48  92.50 
10   319  7.5 100 
    
Total 4,251 100   
 
 